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ABSTRACT 
 
This essay will argue that the reasons behind the Bharatiya Janata Party’s (BJP) 
rise to national prominence in India during the 1990’s can be traced to the 
growing insecurity that the Hindu majority experienced during this period 
because changing conditions on the ground made it appear as if the nation was 
being controlled by the Muslim minority. The BJP played on this perception and 
mobilized politically, asserting that the increasing power of the minority 
necessitated solidarity in India’s Hindu population. The analysis that this essay 
will undertake will first characterize the reasons behind the Hindu perception of 
the Muslim threat. The subsequent section will examine the means that the BJP 
employed to play on the fears of the Hindu majority. In concluding, the essay will 
distil lessons from the BJP’s rise in the 1990’s and argue that in the future, the 
BJP will have difficulty returning to power on a purely Hindu nationalist platform 
because the perceived threat from Muslims is no longer as prevalent as it was 
during the 1990’s. 
 
 
 
Introduction 
The 1990’s marked the emergence of a new and unprecedented 
development in Indian politics as the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), 
a Hindu nationalist party, assumed a position of national 
significance. Some political commentators have argued that the 
emergence of this party was the culmination of a sustained effort on 
the part of the BJP, Bharatiya Jan Sangh (BJS), Vishwa Hindu 
Parishad (VHP) and the Rashtriya Swayamsavak Sangh (RSS) to 
bring Hinduism into mainstream politics.
1
 While it is true that 
Hindu nationalism was a strong force nurtured by these groups prior 
                                                 
1 Yogendra K. Malik and V. B. Singh, Hindu Nationalists in India the Rise of the 
Bharatiya Janata Party, Boulder, Westview Press, 1994. 
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to the 1990’s, the entry of this force onto the Indian political scene 
heralded a new era in the history of Indian politics. 
 
 This essay will seek to answer the following questions: How 
and why did the BJP rise to prominence in the 1990’s, finally 
winning a national election in 1998? Though the role of Hindu 
nationalist feeder organizations was important, this explanation 
does not account for the characteristics that made the 1990’s 
unique. Specifically, the BJP’s rise can be traced to the underlying 
fact that, during this period, there was a growing insecurity in the 
Hindu majority because changing conditions on the ground made it 
appear as if the nation was being controlled by the Muslim 
minority. The BJP played on this perception and mobilized 
politically, asserting that the increasing power of the minority 
necessitated solidarity in India’s Hindu population.  
 
 The analysis that this essay will undertake will first 
characterize the reasons behind the Hindu perception that the 
Muslim population posed a threat to Hindus in India. Consequently, 
the essay will examine: (1) changing demographics (i.e., increase) 
of the Muslim population, and (2) political mobilization in the 
1980’s and 1990’s (i.e., the growth of Islamic fundamentalism and 
changing voting patterns of the Muslim population). The 
subsequent section of the essay will examine the means that the BJP 
employed to play on the fears of the Hindu majority. In concluding, 
the essay will distil lessons from the BJP’s rise in the 1990’s and 
argue that in the future, the BJP will have difficulty returning to 
power on a purely Hindu nationalist platform because the perceived 
threat from Muslims to Hindus is no longer as prevalent as it was 
during the 1990’s. 
 
Changing Demographics of the 1980’s and 1990’s 
Since the time of Independence to the mid 1990’s, most data 
indicate that there was a significant increase in the percentage of the 
total population that was Muslim in India.
2
 Specifically, between 
                                                 
2 Malika Mistry, "Role of Religion in Fertility and Family Planning in India," 
Indian Journal of Secularism, 3 (1999), 9 Apr., 2006. 
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1947 and 1994, the Muslim population increased from a little less 
than 10% of the total population to just over 12% whereas the 
population of Hindus declined from 85% to 82%.
3
 In addition, 
reports show that Muslims had a significantly higher birth rate than 
did Hindus in the 1950’s, 1960’s, and the 1970s.
4
 For example, 
during this period, the National Family Health Survey indicated that 
while the fertility rate for Muslims was 4.41, it was 3.30 for Hindus, 
meaning that the average Indian Muslim woman had one more child 
than did her Hindu counterpart.
5
  Further, Table 1 below 
demonstrates that the decadal population growth rate for Muslims 
markedly increased in the following three decades: 1961-1971, 
1971-1981 and 1981-1991.
6
 At the same time, the rate for all other 
religious groups declined. In sum, the Muslim population’s pattern 
of growth prior to 1991 indicates that by the 1990’s, a Muslim 
population bubble was at or near adulthood and continuing to 
grow.
7
 This increasing population was a major factor behind the 
Hindu perception that Muslims were growing in number and 
exerting a greater influence in India.
8
  
 
Table 1: Percentage Decadal Growth Rates by each Religious 
Group 
Religion 1931-
1941 
1951-
1961 
1961-
1971 
1971-
1981 
1981-
1991 
Hindu 13.23 20.89 23.69 24.15 22.78 
Muslim 19.09 32.89 30.85 30.58 32.76 
Christian 24.50 30.78 32.60 16.77 16.89 
Sikh 31.60 26.53 32.28 26.16 25.48 
Jain 15.81 26.73 28.48 23.69 4.42 
Buddhist 4.28 16.71 17.20 22.52 35.98 
                                                 
3 Mistry, ibid.  
4 Koenraad Elst, Bharatiya Janata Party Vis-áa-Vis Hindu Resurgence, New 
Delhi, Voice of India, 1997. 
5 Neil Devotta, "Demography and Communalism in India," Journal of 
International Affairs, 56 (2002). 
6 Mistry, op. cit.  
7 Elst, op.cit. 
8 Devotta, op. cit. 
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Another significant variable that influenced demographics in 
India during the 1980’s and the 1990’s was illegal immigration 
from neighbouring Bangladesh which witnessed a population 
explosion during the 1970’s and 1980’s. This rapid population 
increase combined with Bangladesh’s slow economic development. 
As a result, the country was not able to support its growing 
numbers.
9
 Persecution of the minority populations during this 
period added a further impetus to migration patterns. Consequently, 
immigration from Bangladesh increased in the 1980’s and the 
1990’s, and as of 1990, there were about 15 million Bangladeshi 
nationals living in India illegally.
10
  
 
Illegal immigration contributed to the perception that the 
Muslim population in India was growing rapidly. Though there was 
a gap between this perception and the reality on the ground because 
some immigrants from Bangladesh were, in fact, Hindus fearing 
political repression, most Indians equated Bangladeshis with 
Muslims. As a result, the perceived threat to India’s sovereignty 
from ‘Muslim’ immigrants from Bangladesh grew as illegal 
immigration increased.
11
 
 
At the national level, this perception was amplified by the 
fact that illegal immigration became a flashpoint issue during this 
period. For example, politicians in West Bengal encouraged 
Bangladeshi immigration as a means of garnering votes, a divisive 
policy that became controversial not only at the local level in West 
Bengal but at the national level as well.
12
 Further, since the 
immigrant population from Bangladesh was concentrated in the 
border states of West Bengal and Assam,
13
 there was a skewed 
                                                 
9 Pranati Dutta, "Push-Pull Factors of Undocumented Migration From 
Bangladesh to West Bengal: a Perception Study," The Qualitative Report, 9 
(2004): 335-358. 
10 Dutta, ibid., 335-358. 
11 Devotta, op. cit. 
12 Dutta, op. cit., 335-358. 
13 Dutta, op. cit., 335-358. 
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belief that Bangladeshi immigrants were taking over these border 
states.
14
 Immigration from Bangladesh to India, thus, appeared to 
add to this regional divisiveness and emerged as a significant 
problem that constituted a ‘Muslim threat’ to India’s sovereignty. 
 
Changing Patterns of Activism 
At the time of Independence, India’s Muslim population was 
largely accommodating; they supported the Congress Party and 
sought to maintain their position in society by shying away from 
political conflict. In the 1980’s and 1990’s, however, the Indian 
Muslim voice became increasingly pronounced in various arenas of 
formal and informal politics. This section will examine two trends 
of mobilization that occurred in the 1980s and 1990s that 
contributed to the perception that Muslims were gaining power: (1) 
the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, and (2) the increasing 
importance of the ‘Muslim’ vote to election outcomes.  
 
The Growth of Islamic Fundamentalism and Terrorism 
During the 1980’s and 1990’s, Islamic fundamentalism witnessed a 
significant rise worldwide, most notably in Iran and Afghanistan.
15
 
A parallel phenomenon occurred in India as a vocal sector of the 
Muslim population began to view extremism as a viable outlet and 
turned to terrorism as a means of furthering their cause.
16
 Though 
this did not mean that the majority of the Muslim population turned 
to advocating violence or radical reform, the growth in 
fundamentalist influence did become fairly apparent in Indian 
society. In examining the growth of militant fundamentalism in 
India during the 1980’s and 1990’s, it is important to emphasize the 
following: (1) growth of Islamic fundamentalism in General Zia ul 
Haq’s Pakistan, (2) emergence of terrorist groups, (3) ‘ethnic 
cleansing’ and forced relocation of Kashmiri Hindus, and (4) 
terrorist attacks in Bombay in 1993. These factors fed into the 
perception that Muslims were challenging the Hindus of India.  
                                                 
14 Dutta, op. cit., 335-358. 
15 Krishna Kumar, "Religious Fundamentalism in India and Beyond, Parameters, 
(2002): 17-33. 
16 Kumar, ibid., 17-33. 
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Fear of Islamic fundamentalism in India began with the 
1977 rise to power of General Zia-ul-Haq in neighbouring Pakistan. 
After coming to power, Zia undertook an ‘Islamization’ policy and 
imposed Sharia law in the 1979 Hudood Ordinances. These 
draconian measures called for amputation of limbs as penalty for 
theft, flogging as punishment for adultery, and strict enforcement of 
Islam in all aspects of daily life.
17
 The Islamization of neighbouring 
Pakistan demonstrated the adverse consequences engendered by an 
adoption of Islamic fundamentalism.
18
 Thus, there was a heightened 
Hindu consciousness that emerged as a reactionary response.
19
  
 
In conjunction with the growth of Islamic fundamentalist 
forces in Pakistan, the 1980’s also witnessed a marked rise in 
terrorist groups in India. For example, the Student Islamic 
Movement of India (SIMI), founded on April 25, 1977 at Aligarh 
Muslim University,
20
 grew significantly in the 1980’s and 1990’s 
and represented an example of a major fundamentalist group that 
began to exert considerable influence. The growth of SIMI was 
marked by two phases. In the first, during the 1980’s, SIMI 
garnered support at the grassroots level while promoting the 
establishment of Dar-ul-Islam (land of Islam) in India, and the 
forced conversion of all Hindus to Islam by any means necessary.
21
 
In the second phase, SIMI transformed into a terrorist organization 
that sponsored violent attacks directed at civilians.
22
 Beginning in 
1992, for example, SIMI advocated a militant Islamic 
                                                 
17 Jessica Stern, "Pakistan's Jihad Culture," Foreign Affairs, November (2000). 
18 Malik and Singh, op. cit., p. 71. 
19 Robert L. Hardgrave, "The Challenge of Ethnic Conflict in India: the 
Dilemmas of Diversity," Journal of Democracy, 4 (1993): 54-68. 
20 Irfan Ahmad, "Between Moderation and Radicalization: Transnational 
Interactions of Jamaat-E-Islami of India," Global Networks, 5 (2005): 279-299. 
21 Yoginder Sikand, "Islamist Assertion in Contemporary India: the Case of the 
Students Islamic Movement of India," Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 23 
(2003). 
22 R Upadhyay, "Student Islamic Movement of India (SIMI)," South Asia 
Analysis Group (2003), 13 May 2006 
<http://www.saag.org/papers9/paper825.html>. 
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fundamentalism that gained considerable influence among the 
Muslim minority in the Hindi heartland; SIMI organized a series of 
violent protests during which activists clashed with police and 
members of the Sangh-Parivar.
23
 Consequently, SIMI’s growth in 
the 1980’s and its violent turn in the 1990’s demonstrated the 
growth of militant fundamentalism in India.
24
  
 
The rise of the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), which occurred 
mainly in the early 1990’s, demonstrated another important Islamic 
fundamentalist force that posed a radical threat to the Indian nation. 
The group was comprised largely of mujahadeens who came to 
fight in Jammu-Kashmir after the conclusion of the Soviet War in 
Afghanistan in the late 1980’s.
25
 While a detailed examination of 
the LeT’s activities are beyond the scope of this paper, it is 
important to note that the LeT undertook several significant terrorist 
actions against civilians in Kashmir. In fact, some scholars have 
argued that the LeT was covertly funded by Pakistan’s ISI. 
Regardless of its funding sources, however, most scholars agree that 
the LeT acted as the primary force behind the growth of the 
Kashmir insurgency in the 1990’s.
26
  
 
Another factor that contributed to the perceived threat from 
Muslims that Hindus experienced in the 1980’s and 1990’s came 
from the forced relocation of Kashmiri Hindus from Jammu-
Kashmir.
27
 Specifically, terrorist groups such as the LeT and 
prominent Islamic forces directed a campaign to displace Kashmiri 
Hindu Pandits, the most significant Hindu group in the state. As a 
result, thousands of Kashmiri Pandits were forced to flee the 
Kashmir valley, leaving behind their ancestral homes and 
properties.
28
 The perceived human rights violations of a Hindu 
                                                 
23 Sikand, op. cit. 
24 Sikand, op. cit. 
25 Samina Yasmeen, "Pakistan's Kashmir Policy: Voices of Moderation?",  
Contemporary South Asia, 12 (2003): 187-202. 
26 Yasmeen, ibid., 187-202. 
27 Amalendu Misra, "Hindu Nationalism and Muslim Minority Rights in India," 
Intenational Journal on Minority and Group Rights, 7 (2000): 1-18. 
28 Malik and Singh, op. cit., 225.  
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group by Islamic groups served as a symbol to the greater Indian 
population that Muslims posed a threat to the Hindu nation.  
 
Finally, the terrorist attacks that rocked Mumbai on March 
12, 1993 served as a symbol of the consequences of allowing 
Islamic fundamentalist ideals to flourish in India. Specifically, this 
attack marked the first terrorist attack of its size to strike a major 
Indian city. In the wake of the blasts, the official number of dead 
was 257 with 1,400 others injured. According to Yogendra Malik 
and V.B. Singh, the attack was allegedly undertaken in response to 
the communal riots that gripped India in the wake of the 1992 
destruction of the Babri Masjid Mosque in Ayodhya.
29
 In 
conjunction with the growth of Islamic fundamentalism in Pakistan, 
the increased violence of the Kashmir insurgency, and the 
displacement of Kashmiri Pandits, the terrorist attacks took the 
form of a direct threat to India; the destruction that ensued 
demonstrated the degree to which Islamic fundamentalist forces 
could challenge Indian sovereignty and, thus, spurred a continued 
perception in India that Islam was rising as an affront to the Hindu 
nation.  
 
The ‘Muslim’ Vote 
Before beginning the analysis of the trends in voting of the Muslim 
population during the 1980’s and 1990’s, it is important to briefly 
examine the fragmented body politic that emerged in the wake of 
Indira Gandhi’s assassination in 1984. Scholars have noted that as a 
result of her extremely personalized rule and the lack of 
development of a party organizational structure, the Congress party 
went into decline, creating a political vacuum which was filled by 
competing regional, caste and linguistic interests.
30
 Further, because 
Indira Gandhi failed to alleviate poverty in the ways that she had 
promised in her Garibi Hatao platform, Indian people became 
disillusioned with Congress dominance and turned to alternate 
                                                 
29 Malik and Singh, op. cit., 245.  
30 Robert Hardgrave, and Stanley Kochanek, India: Government and Politics in a 
Developing Nation, Orlando, Harcourt Press, 2000, 151-153. 
Peace and Democracy in South Asia, Volume 2, Numbers 1 & 2, 2006. 
 96 
political parties.
31
 As a result of the stark divisions that 
characterized the Indian body politic, the 1980’s and 1990’s were 
marked by a more competitive electoral environment in which 
coalition building and the support of consistent vote banks became 
the hallmark of a successful political strategy. Since the Muslim 
population constituted such a vote bank and parties sought to gain 
the ‘Muslim’ vote as a means of winning elections, the possibility 
emerged that they were determining political outcomes.   
 
Specifically, this voting bloc became an invaluable source of 
political strength because Muslims tended to vote as a single entity; 
their common religion served to supersede issues such as class and 
region. Paul Brass labelled this phenomenon the “critical 
importance of the Muslim vote”
32
 as he argued that the Muslim 
population voted “en bloc,”
33
 and that this unilateral support was 
essential to success during the 1989 9
th
 General Lok Sabha 
Elections in Uttar Pradesh (UP).
34
 For example, the Balampur 
Constituency, a constituency with 20% Muslim population, elected 
Fazlul Rahman as an Independent candidate because support for 
opposition parties was divided between the BJP, Congress, and 
regional parties; the Muslim vote, however, stood solidly behind 
Rahman.
35
 In the same vein, in the Hamirpur Constituency where 
Muslims only made up 10% of the population, the Muslim vote was 
once again a key to success. The three major parties (BJP, Congress 
and Janata) divided the votes evenly. However, the party that 
received the Muslim vote, the Janata Party, claimed the 
constituency.
36
  
 
                                                 
31 Yogendra K. Malik and V. B. Singh, Hindu Nationalists in India the Rise of the 
Bharatiya Janata Party, Boulder, Westview Press, 1994. 
32 Paul R. Brass, "Caste, Class, and Community in the Ninth General Elections 
for the Lok Sabha in Uttar Pradesh,"India Votes, ed. Harold A. Gould and Sumit 
Ganguly, Boulder, Westview Press, 1993, 108-138. 
33 Brass, ibid., 114.  
34 Brass, ibid., 108. 
35 Brass, ibid., 113-117.  
36 Brass, ibid., 113-117. 
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As a result, in the 1990’s, parties began to directly seek the 
support of the Muslim vote bank. In fact, this policy became the 
guiding theme behind the emergence of Dalit and low caste parties 
who built coalitions consisting of caste blocs and the Muslim 
population. Three examples of such parties are the Samajwadi Party 
(SP), the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP), and the Rashtriya Janata Dal 
(RJD) in Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and Madhya Pradesh.
37
 In order to 
look at the pattern specifically, it will be helpful to study the rise of 
the BSP, a Dalit Party, based in Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh. 
Scholars have noted that the BSP owed its rise in the late 1980’s 
and the 1990’s to its capacity to reach beyond the Dalit population 
to the Muslim population.
38
  
 
For one, the BSP undertook a concerted effort to run 
Muslim candidates as a means of attracting the ‘Muslim’ vote. At a 
rally in 1996, for example, the BSP Chief Minister Kumari 
Mayawati declared that “if in all the constituencies, the two lakh 
Muslim votes come to the BSP, then I can assure you that all of the 
fourteen candidates from the Muslim community will become 
members of Parliament.”
39
 Mayawati’s statement exemplified the 
BSP olive branch extended to the Muslim vote bank. Specifically, 
in the 1996 general elections in Madhya Pradesh, 19% of the BSP 
candidates were Muslims though Muslims only made up 5% of the 
population of the state. As a result, the BSP polled 8.2% of the vote 
in Madhya Pradesh even though their previous highest voting total 
had been 4% in the general election of 1989.
 40
 A similar trend 
emerged in Uttar Pradesh during the 1996 general elections but to 
an even greater degree; Muslim politicians made up 51% of the 
candidates.
41
 As a result of this strategy, the BSP received 20.6% of 
the vote; their previous high had been 9.9% in 1989 (See Table 2 
                                                 
37 Christophe Jaffrelot, "The Bahujan Samaj Party in North India: No Longer Just 
a Dalit Party?" Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East, 
18 (1998). 
38 Jaffrelot, ibid. 
39 Kanchan Chandra, Why Ethnic Parties Succeed Patronage and Ethnic Head 
Counts in India, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2004.   
40 Jaffrelot, op. cit. 
41 Jaffrelot, op. cit. 
Peace and Democracy in South Asia, Volume 2, Numbers 1 & 2, 2006. 
 98 
for a summary of the BSP’s growth).
 42
 Consequently, the numbers 
examined here indicate that because the BSP ran significantly more 
Muslim candidates in the 1990’s, it was able to tally a much higher 
vote total than in previous elections and, thus, come to power in 
ruling coalitions. 
 
Table 2: Percentage of votes polled by the BSP during the 1989, 
1991 and 1996 general elections in Madhya Pradesh and Uttar 
Pradesh
43
  
Year Uttar Pradesh Madhya Pradesh 
1989 9.93% 4.28% 
1991 8.70% 3.54% 
1996 20.61% 8.18% 
 
Furthermore, once in power, the BSP pursued policies that 
continued to cater to Muslim interests. This exemplified the degree 
to which the BSP sought to curry the favor of the ‘Muslim’ vote. 
For example, Mayawati, who became the Chief Minister of UP in 
1996, introduced policies that granted Muslims the same 
reservations as Scheduled Caste groups.
44
  
 
The voting patterns in the 1980’s and the new coalitions that 
emerged in the 1990’s demonstrated the importance of the Muslim 
population to electoral outcomes. As a result, there was an 
increased awareness of the power that they were wielding in the 
political framework.
45
  
 
A Brief Historical Comparison 
In examining how Islamic radicalization and the growing 
importance of ‘Muslim’ votes affected the Hindu population, it is 
helpful to consider the 1940’s and 1950’s in comparative 
perspective. During this period, Hindu nationalism grew with the 
Muslim population’s demands for a separate Pakistani state, a 
                                                 
42 Jaffrelot, op. cit. 
43 Jaffrelot, op. cit. 
44 Chandra, op. cit., 216.  
45 Chandra, op. cit., 216.  
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demand that was made formally by Mohammed Ali Jinnah in 1940 
with the Lahore Resolution.
46
 Further, in the aftermath of the 
Partition, the Sangh Parivar (a family of organizations including the 
Bharatiya Janata Party, Vishwa Hindu Parishad, and Rashtriya 
Swayamsevak Sangh, which comprise Hindu nationalism) grew 
because Hindus felt an increasing ‘Muslim’ threat. Through the past 
century, in fact, the growth of Hindu nationalist sentiment has been 
correlated with growing mobilization by Indian Muslims.
47
 The rise 
of ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ and the importance of the ‘Muslim’ 
vote by the early 1990’s presented the Hindu majority with a similar 
challenge. As a result, in both the 1940’s and the 1990’s, apparent 
threats posed by Muslims fostered the development of a heightened 
Hindu consciousness.  
 
BJP Exploitation of the Perception 
The BJP, Sangh Parivar, and the Media 
The analysis up to this point has established that the 1980’s and 
1990’s represented a time of growing fear on the part of the 
majority Hindu population that the minority Muslim population was 
increasing its presence in India, challenging Indian sovereignty, and 
controlling the politics of the country. Though this insecurity was 
based on some truth, it would have remained in the background if 
the BJP, the RSS, and other members of the Sangh Parivar had not 
worked to bring it to the attention of the Hindu population. 
Specifically, since members of the Sangh Parivar enjoyed 
grassroots support that had been cultivated since India’s inception,
48
 
they were able to rally a popular foundation for the BJP. The RSS, 
for example, held mass rallies in the 1990’s at which leadership 
emphasized the ‘threat’ that the Muslim population posed to Hindus 
in India.
49
 Hindu nationalist forces also used the Indian vernacular 
press and other media outlets as a springboard from which to report 
the changing demographics of the Muslim population, the growth in 
                                                 
46 Prakash Louis, op. cit., p. 56.  
47 Kumar, op. cit.  
48 Malik and Singh, op. cit., p. 71.  
49 Nikita Sud, Secularism and the Gujarati State 1960-2005, Department of 
International Development, University of Oxford (2003). 
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Islamic extremism, and the importance of Muslim votes.
50
 
Specifically, a key part of the Sangh Parivar strategy in support of 
the BJP was its effort to bring the change in objective conditions to 
the attention of the Hindu population through its use of mass 
media.
51
    
 
The RSS’ efforts at portraying the changing demographics 
in India exemplify this trend. Studies published by the group in the 
1990’s consistently emphasized the growth in the Muslim 
population and the threat that this population posed to the Hindu 
majority. For example, a study circulated by the RSS in the 
aftermath of the 1991 census read that “the fact remained as 
prominent as ever that the rate of population growth of Muslims is 
much higher than that of the Hindus, particularly in some areas 
where the majority is on the verge of being reduced into 
minority.”
52
  
 
It is also helpful to note the changing nature of movies in the 
1990’s. During this decade, BJP sympathizers in the movie industry 
undertook a concerted effort to portray the ‘Islamic’ threat that 
India faced; a series of action movies depicted terrorists infiltrating 
India and plotting against the government. This trend culminated in 
the blockbuster hit Mission Kashmir which portrayed Islamic 
terrorists scheming to assassinate the Prime Minister.
53
 As a result, 
scholars have noted that Hindi film dramas post-1990 displayed a 
remarkably consistent pattern in producing a monolithic Hindu 
identity under threat from Islam.
54
 BJP partisans, thus, used Hindi 
film as an outlet from which to play up Hindu insecurity, harnessing 
                                                 
50 Robin Jeffrey, "Media Revolution and 'Hindu Politics in North India: 1982-
1999," 18 May 2006 <http://www.himalmag.com/july2001/essay.html>. 
51 Jeffrey, ibid.  
52 Foreword," Bharatiya Janata Party, 18 May 2006, 
<http://www.bjp.org/Publication/CE.pdf>. 
53 Gyan Prakash, The Muslim in Hindi Cinema, Princeton University, New 
Jersey, 15 Nov. 2005. 
54 Sheena Malhotra, and Tavishi Alagh, "Dreaming the Nation: Domestic Dramas 
in Hindi Films Post-1990," South Asian Popular Culture, 2 (2004): 19-37. 
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the media as a means of communicating to people the changing 
conditions that characterized India at the time.    
 
The Indian Government ‘Pandering’ to Muslims 
The BJP employed several other strategies to cement a Hindu 
identity and take advantage of the unique conditions in India during 
the early 1990’s. The remainder of this section will examine the 
following: (1) the characterization of the Indian government as 
‘pandering’ to Muslim interests, and (2) the adoption of key 
‘symbolic’ mobilizations that served to play on the underlying 
Hindu fear. 
 
The BJP adopted a critical stance in the late 1980’s and 
1990’s that emphasized key instances where the Indian government 
gave in to Muslims at the expense of the majority population. 
Consequently, the BJP played on the perception examined in the 
preceding sections by emphasizing cases where it appeared as 
though Muslims were controlling Indian affairs.   
 
For one, the BJP emphasized what they called the lack of 
true secularism in India; instead, they claimed that the Indian 
secularism of the Congress and its institutions gave concessions to 
Muslims. BJP leadership, thus, denounced the presence of parallel 
Civil Codes; a secular code that governed Hindus and an Islamic 
code for Muslims.
55
 The BJP also cited the Shah Bano case as an 
example of how Indian secularism gave concessions to Muslim 
interests. Though Shah Bano, who was divorced after 43 years of 
marriage, was awarded a monthly maintenance from her husband as 
per a Supreme Court ruling in 1978, political pressure from Muslim 
clerics induced Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and the Congress 
government to pass a Bill in 1986 that nullified the ruling.
56
 The 
BJP quickly seized this opportunity to demonstrate how the 
Congress Party ‘pandered’ to Muslims at the expense of the Hindu 
majority.
57
 Consequently, the BJP argued that India needed a 
                                                 
55 Malik and Singh, op. cit., p. 83.  
56 Malik and Singh, op. cit., p. 83. 
57 Malik and Singh, op. cit., p. 110.  
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“positive secularism” whereby differential treatment of Indians on 
the basis of religion would not compromise the equality of all 
groups and citizens.
58
  
 
In the same vein, the BJP highlighted a series of other issues 
that exemplified the theme that the ‘tail was wagging the dog’ in 
Indian affairs. The BJP argued, for example, that the special status 
granted to the Muslim majority state of Jammu-Kashmir as per 
Article 370 of the Indian Constitution represented an issue on which 
the Indian government had given in to Muslim interests. 
Specifically, the BJP declared that the Congress Party had sold out 
Hindus because while Hindu majority states were treated equally 
and governed by a single law, the sole Muslim state in India was 
given special treatment.
59
  
 
Similarly, when Salman Rushdie published his The Satanic 
Verses in 1988 in which he portrayed the prophet Mohammed in a 
controversial light, the Indian government moved quickly to ban the 
publication after a widespread indictment of the book by prominent 
Indian Muslim leaders. As with previous cases, the BJP highlighted 
this incident as evidence of the fact that Muslims were controlling 
the formulation of policy and were curtailing free expression, a 
bulwark of Indian democracy.
60
 Consequently, BJP mobilization 
was grounded in its usage of key events as evidence of the growing 
influence of Indian Muslims. The BJP was, thus, able to play on the 
underlying threat that the Hindu majority felt from the Muslim 
minority.
61
 
 
`Hindu’ Indian Nationalism and Identity Politics 
The BJP also undertook a concerted effort in tandem with the Sangh 
Parivar to harness Indian nationalism as a mobilizing force by re-
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defining Indian identity as intrinsically Hindu. India was renamed 
in Hindu nationalist literature as “Ram Rajya” or as the “Kingdom 
of Ram.” In addition, the BJP, RSS, VHP and the Jan Sangh 
leadership portrayed Muslims as converts from Hinduism.
62
 In 
conjunction with a redefinition of Indian identity, the BJP worked 
with its Sangh Parivar allies to undertake targeted symbolic 
mobilizations. These served to demonstrate the theme that Hindus 
had to unite to preserve Indian identity from `foreign’ Muslim 
forces.  
 
A primary part of the Hindu Right’s reformulation of Indian 
identity was its rewriting of Indian history. The history that the 
Sangh Parivar told was a story in which India’s Hindu population 
had been constantly suppressed and stifled by Muslim domination. 
Accordingly, BJP activists traced the peak of Indian civilization to 
the Gupta period prior to the 11
th
 century. However, according to 
this story, Muslim conquests such as Mohammed of Ghazni’s 
invasion of India in the 11
th
 century brought this civilization down. 
The subsequent Muslim conquests under the sultanate, and the 
growth of the Mughal Empire, thus, were depicted by the BJP and 
its allies as bloody struggles during which entire Hindu populations 
were victimized and massacred.
63
 The BJP campaign emphasized 
the fact that the Muslims were foreign invaders and had sacked and 
pillaged the Hindu population in the past. This led to the formation 
of a distinctly Hindu identity directed at preventing a similar 
Muslim invasion in contemporary times, an invasion that took the 
form of the perceived threat that the Hindu population felt from the 
Muslim minority.
64
   
 
The Hindu Right’s rewriting of Indian history was combined 
with targeted, symbolic mobilizations that cemented an Indian 
‘Hindu’ identity. In general terms, the BJP’s symbolic politics 
served to emphasize the perpetual conflict between Hindus and 
Muslims and demonstrate the increasing upper hand that the 
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Muslims were gaining. The Ayodhya campaign (i.e., `Ram 
Janmabhoomi’) represented the ultimate instance of the BJP’s 
symbolic politics.
65
 The effort to resurrect the temple at Ram’s 
birthplace was an important means of demonstrating the threat 
posed to Hindus by Muslims and, in this way, consolidating India’s 
Hindu identity.
66
  
 
In order to shed light on the BJP’s politics of identity, it is 
helpful to examine `Ram Janmabhoomi’ in more detail. During this 
campaign, the BJP worked with the RSS to sponsor a mass Indian 
movement during which Hindus across India were encouraged to 
perform puja on bricks before sending them to Ayodhya.
67
 
Similarly, in 1990, L. K. Advani, a prominent leader of the BJP, 
undertook a rathyatra (a religious procession) across India from the 
Hindu holy site of Somnath to Ayodhya while travelling in a bus 
decorated to resemble the chariot of the Hindu God Ram.
68
 Finally, 
the BJP and the Sangh Parivar created posters and cartoons 
depicting the Hindu God Ram fighting against the Mughal ruler 
Babur.
69
 Though these are only a few examples of the widespread 
symbols that the BJP adopted, more generally, they demonstrated 
how the BJP’s symbolic mobilizations during the 1990s served to 
demonstrate the underlying theme that the Hindu identity and 
Muslim identity were in conflict; Hindus had to unite to defend 
their identity from Muslim invasion. Consequently, the increased 
perception of Muslim dominance in India was given a political 
outlet for expression in the BJP. As a result, the BJP rose to national 
prominence in the 1990’s and unseated the Congress government in 
1998. 
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Conclusion and the Future of the BJP 
In sum, this paper has examined the BJP’s rise to power in the 
1990’s. While there were a number of factors that underpinned this 
rise, the 1980’s and 1990’s marked a unique period in India during 
which it appeared that Muslims were gaining in prominence and 
exerting a disproportionately large influence in Indian affairs. 
Underlying this belief was the changing demographics of the 
Muslim population, the growth of Islamic extremism, and the 
increased importance of the ‘Muslim’ vote to electoral outcomes. 
These factors paved the way for the BJP to enter the political sphere 
and work with the Sangh Parivar to use the media to play on Hindu 
insecurity. Further, the BJP successfully characterized the Indian 
government as ‘pandering’ to Muslims, and undertook key 
symbolic mobilizations as a means of cementing a Hindu identity. 
The result was the rapid rise of the BJP in the 1990’s which 
culminated in an electoral victory in 1998. 
 
Considering the contemporary state of Indian politics, the 
argument that this paper has examined begs the question as to 
where the BJP will go from its most recent electoral defeat in 2004. 
An empirical regularity seems to exist suggesting that the BJP (and 
its predecessor political organizations) have followed an oscillating 
pattern; periods during which they are Hindu nationalist social 
movements and moderate phases during which they act as political 
parties.
70
 A similar pattern emerged in 2004. After the BJP’s loss, 
prominent BJP activists called for a return to Hindutva roots and 
radical Hindu fundamentalism as a means of consolidating 
control.
71
 Some scholars, however, have noted that the BJP needs to 
break out of its cycle. The BJP expert Christophe Jaffrelot argues, 
for example, that a “strategy of moderation appears to be 
necessary.”
72
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The argument made in this paper lends credence to 
Jaffrelot’s argument. The 1990’s marked a unique period in India in 
that the Hindu population felt increasingly vulnerable and insecure. 
Accordingly, the BJP was able to effectively use its polarizing, 
Hindu nationalist policies and symbolic mobilizations. This 
environment, however, has changed. Hindu-Muslim relations have 
improved, the Kashmir conflict has become less militant, and 
Muslims are no longer the coveted swing vote that they were during 
the 1980’s and the 1990’s. Specifically, the ‘Muslim’ vote has 
become increasingly divided by class.
73
 In addition, alliances such 
as the Dalit-Muslim alliance have fallen apart because they failed to 
adequately represent a coalition of groups that did not share the 
same interests.
74
   
 
The future of the BJP as a viable second national political 
party, thus, lies in a moderate stance. It should emphasize its 
economic, domestic, and foreign policies as well as its ability to 
address those areas where the Congress Party has failed.  
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